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seeking to encourage the Church in her traditional opposition to the Soviets. But the *Post Dispatch* regretted that the Kremlin should have chosen such an unimportant person as Orlemanski for such a demonstration. The *Louisville Courier* deplored the censure passed on this priest by his bishop; no doubt the latter tolerated disparagement of the Soviet Union, but not efforts to understand it.

The truth seems to be that Father Orlemanski's initiative, whether concerted with Moscow or not, aroused in Slavonic circles reactions calculated to handicap the Government and prejudice Roosevelt's electoral campaign. While the Slavonic Committee of America approved this initiative, the *émigré* Poles threatened to launch a campaign which would have brought Washington and Moscow into opposition. It happened that Orlemanski's superiors were of Irish origin—which, obviously, did not predispose them to regard his journey with a favourable eye. In any case, the episcopal decision and the priest's submission cut short any attempts at propaganda, thus rendering a very opportune service to the Government, but postponing or compromising the perspective of a possible easing of the situation, if not of a *rapprochement* between Poland and the Soviets, and between the Soviets and the Vatican.

In Latin America the headquarters of the permanent Slav Committee were at Montevideo, where, in April, 1943, three hundred and ninety-four Slav delegates assembled at a Congress which established the Union of Slav Nationals (they were estimated at two millions), to organise the struggle against pro-Hitlerian activities.

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This sketch of the recovery of the Slavs in the Old World and the New brings out two features: the gravitation of all the Slavonic nations round the Muscovite colossus, and the repugnance of a sector of Polish opinion to this method of regrouping.

As was to be anticipated, German propaganda affected to see in this the execution of a plan tending to 'Bolshevise' Europe, and even America. Germany again launched her old commonplaces about the inferiority of the Slavs. A Radio-Paris broadcast (February 21, 1943) assured listeners 'that about one-quarter of the American population is composed of Slavonic elements, of

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Negroids, and of Jews, and that this degeneracy warrants our suspecting American morals'. Remarks which were not very flattering for the Slovaks, the Croats, and the Bulgars, whose Governments were still allies of the Axis. 'Naturally', Radoslavov, a Bulgarian minister was to say, 'we belong to the Slavonic race. But we are, first and foremost, Bulgars. We act in accordance with our own interests and not with the interests of the Slavonic peoples in general'. And the *Zora*, of Sofia, went one farther, reproaching Stalin, a Georgian, who had always rejected racial concepts, for posing as the head of the Slavs, and for rallying to racial theories. 'With God's help', this paper concluded, 'the Soviets will never be able to overthrow the Eastern front'.

Other objections kept polemical discussions alive. M. Benes one day expressed to the Czechoslovak Council his desire to see Poland 'independent, democratic, and friendly', joining the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement. 'This', he said, 'would mean the definite settlement of all the differences outstanding between our three countries and would assure their future by guaranteeing peace in this part of the globe; Germany would never again dare to start a world war'.

This declaration aroused unfriendly or sceptical comments in part of the Turkish press. For a long time that press had been watching the development of the Slavonic orientation in Soviet policy. 'The new Panslav movement', the officially-inspired *Ulus* had said, 'will be followed with the greatest attention, especially by those non-Slavonic nations which were formerly the object of that policy'.[9]

This time it was the *Tanin* which asked why, since the expression 'Pangermanic Imperialism' applied to the union of Germans, that of 'Panslavonic Imperialism' should not describe the union of Slavs? An article in *Pravda*,[10] an obvious reflection of Moscow's ideas on Slav solidarity, refuted this assertion at great length. The Soviet leader-writer recalled that, for a thousand years, the history of Eastern Europe had been that of the defence of the Slavonic peoples against the German invader. 'The historical atmosphere has changed', he said, 'but the object of the German conquerors is unchangeable—to separate the Slavs by force'. There were, he added (for the benefit of the

[9] August 13, 1941.
[10] February 13, 1944.

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mediatisation. In the past, Slavism had mobilised more feeling than will-power, animated more Congresses than Crusades. It now reassumed the academic, 'poet and professor' form it had exhibited a hundred years earlier.

So that Russia's first acts as a liberating power were not particularly Slavonic. In virtue of the ethnical principle, exercised in her own favour, she annexed to the Ukraine Carpatho-Ruthenia, which had been a Civilisation Front for another Slavonic power—Czechoslovakia. As far as Poland was concerned Russia drew the logical advantages of her victory. Poland's annexation of Prussia's Eastern Marches was simply compensation for the amputations she suffered in favour of the Ukraine and of White Russia. The support discreetly given by Moscow to the Bulgaro-Yugoslav claims on Aegean Macedonia reflected less concern for Slav solidarity than the desire to liberate the outlet from the Straits.

The award of the Teschen Basin, once more disputed between Poland and Czechoslovakia, provided Russia with a very delicate arbitration task, in which the necessity for compensating the sacrifices demanded of the Poles weighed more heavily than the memory of Czech fidelity; had not Czechoslovakia, for ten years, been considered as the 'aircraft-carrier' of Soviet military power?

In reality—and a large dose of ingenuousness was required in order to believe that it could ever be otherwise—the territorial changes over which the Russians presided were all inspired by Russian interests, in the historical and traditional sense of the word.

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Let us briefly recall the evolution of the Slavonic peoples immediately after their liberation.

Poland was, during the war, represented by a Government-in-exile in London, which negotiated with the Allies, to whom they gave valuable military assistance. In Moscow this Government was regarded as 'reactionary' and incompatible with a policy of good Polish-Sovietic relations. So it was constantly attacked by the Russian leaders and the Russian press.

As long as the war was conducted outside Polish territory, London and Washington classed this dispute with those that are